What Lacan said re: architecture by Holm, Lorens
                                                              
University of Dundee
What Lacan said re: architecture
Holm, Lorens
Published in:
Critical Quarterly
DOI:
10.1111/1467-8705.00286
Publication date:
2000
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Holm, L. (2000). What Lacan said re: architecture. Critical Quarterly, 42(2), 29-64. 10.1111/1467-8705.00286
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 19. Mar. 2016
 1 
What Lacan said Re: architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lorens Holm 
January 2000 
 2 
Introduction:  certain stereognoses 
 
Before the systematic establishment of geometric laws of 
perspective formulated at the end of the fifteenth century…, 
painting passed through a stage in which various artifices made 
it possible to structure space.  The double band that appears in 
the sixth century on the wall of Santa Maria Maggiore is one way 
of treating certain stereognoses….  The important thing is that 
at a given moment one arrives at illusion.  Around it one finds a 
sensitive spot, a lesion, a locus of pain, a point of reversal of 
the whole of history of art…; that point concerns the notion that 
the illusion of space is different from the creation of 
emptiness.  It is this that the appearance of anamorphosis at the 
end of the sixteenth century represents.1 
 
In this quote from Seminar 7 The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, Lacan recaps a recent session on 
anamorphosis in which he discusses architecture and its 
relation to painting.  Architecture is that which is 
‘organised around emptiness’.  A trawl through the indices 
of Lacan’s Seminars shows that this is the only place Lacan 
uses architecture explicitly, and discusses architecture’s 
general conditions, at least in so far as these conditions 
are deemed primitive.  This is surprisingly little, given 
that critical discourse revolving around issues of 
representation/perception in architecture, have followed 
the lead of the visual arts in founding itself on the gaze.  
This discourse references the section in The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-
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Analysis (Seminar 11), called ‘What is a picture’, where 
the imaginary register has its definitive statement, but 
where architecture is not discussed and barely mentioned.  
Lacan also develops the imaginary register in Seminar 1 
Freud’s Papers on Technique, Seminar 7, and Seminar 13 
(unpublished).  This paper will attempt to shift the 
grounds of the discussion of representation in architecture 
to these less known works.  It will relate Lacan’s idea of 
emptiness to the critical bits of The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, in particular the structure of 
the scopic field, dominated by the screen and the objet a. 
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis has not entered the 
discourse of representation in architecture or the visual 
arts, even though it is Lacan’s major work on visual 
culture and the arts.  It treats of similar ground to 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement:  the beautiful, the good, the 
relation of man to nature and God, sublimation, art, and 
architecture.  For instance, Hal Foster does not reference 
the above quote in The Return of the Real, which seems 
central to a thesis about art as a screen for the emergence 
of originary trauma in the works of Warhol, Mary Kelly, and 
other contemporary artists.2  Nor does the corresponding 
architectural discourse, which addresses how architecture 
situates the subject of perception in the visual field.  
For instance, Beatriz Colomina, whose ‘LeCorbusier and 
Photography’ was the first paper I know to use the 
operational montage as a way of situating the subject of 
architecture, also makes no mention of this Seminar.3 
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Furthermore, no one writing in the visual arts and 
architecture has taken a close look at ‘Baltrusaitis’ 
excellent dictionary of anamorphoses’[S7p40] which is the 
source for most of Lacan’s visual references, and which 
once known, explains a lot about what drives his arguments.4  
A visual argument motivates Lacan’s text, but it is 
underplayed (latent? repressed?) by both Lacan (his text is 
not illustrated) and his readers (Baltrusaitis is 
overlooked in the literature).  Lacan’s knowledge of 
projection and anamorphosis and their relation to 
architecture comes from Baltrusaitis, who he cites in 
Seminars 7 and 11.  His sensibility is sympathetic to 
Baltrusaitis’ rhetoric/polemic, which positions perspective 
as a device which conflates realism and illusion, and 
which, when ana-morphed, produces hallucinations.5 
It will be a fine day for Lacan studies, if someone 
unpacks Baltrusaitis.  If there is an imago of modern 
subjectivity, it is provided by the complex of visual 
references which the Baltrusaitis text assembles.  It 
brings together the optics of Newton and Descartes, and the 
perspective and projective geometry of Alberti, Niceron, 
Andrea Pozzo.  This visual discourse includes also the 
tradition of optical devices like Durer’s camera lucida and 
the camera obscura, and in a different register Plato’s 
cave; all of which have the peculiar character of sharing 
affinity to both consciousness and architecture, in that 
they situate a subject in relation to a visual world.  
These connections are exploited by Lacan and used as 
resources for the development of the subject-gaze relation.  
Lacan’s optical device introduced in Seminar 1 in the 
discussion of Freud’s essay ‘On Narcissism’ is also part of 
this tradition. 
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This paper is concerned with what Lacan said about 
architecture, as a reconnaissance mission.  While it may 
not matter what Lacan thought about architecture; and while 
it is far more important what architects who think about 
architecture think of Lacan; this paper is important 
because it brings into the discourse of representation, 
material which has largely been passed over.  It is hoped 
that this paper will lead to a better understanding of 
architecture in its visual dimension, enabling discourse-
building, which is the hard work, to continue. 
 
Note 
Although the English translation makes Baltrusaitis 
available to English language Lacan studies, it is of 
limited value because it is derived from the second edition 
(Lacan would have had the first) whose layout was revised.6  
The relation of text to images has a directness in the 
first edition, which gives it a polemic, manifesto-like 
quality, which is lost to the coffee table production 
values evinced by the later editions.  (The first give-away 
that something is amiss are the endpapers which have been 
printed white on black.  What significance could white on 
black have in this context?)  Since a close reading must be 
attentive to this relation, only the first edition is 
relevant to Lacan studies. 
                                                
1  Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII:  The 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960.  p140.  Hereafter referred to 
as S7. 
2  Hal Foster, ‘The return of the real’ in The return of the 
real.  (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1996). 
 6 
                                                                                                                                            
3   Beatriz Colomina, ‘Le Corbusier and Photography’, in 
Assemblage 4.  See also my ‘Reading through the mirror:  
Brunelleschi, Lacan, Le Corbusier’ in Assemblage 18, which was 
inspired and influenced by her work. 
4   Jurgis Baltrusaitis, Anamorphoses ou Perspectives 
Curieuses.  (Paris:  Olivier Perrin Editeur, 1957).  For 
instance, Damisch refers once to ‘the now classic book of Jurgis 
Baltrusaitis’ in The Origin of Perspective.  (Cambridge, MA:  MIT 
Press 1994). 
5   ‘La perspective est généralement  considerée dans 
l’histoire de l’art, comme un facteur de réalisme restituant le 
troisième dimension.  C’est avant tout un artifice….  Nous en 
traitons ici, les aspects fantastiques et le côté absurde.’  
About anamorphism, ‘C’est un rébus, un monstre, un prodige.’  And 
‘Le sujêt de cette étude est l’histoire d’une illusion où le réel 
et l’apparance se trouvent artificiellement disjoints par des 
savants et des artistes.’  Anamorphism annihilates (anéantir) the 
natural order of things and their representation, by applying the 
same rules of representation as perspective does.  After its 
invention, perspective can no longer be aligned with a science of 
reality.  ‘La perspective n’apparaît plus comme une science de la 
realite.  C’est une technique des hallucinations.’ 
6   The second edition of Baltrusaitis, revised, enlarged, and 
retitled Anamorphoses, ou Magie artificielle des effets 
merveilleux (1969) was translated into English as Anamorphic Art.  
Trans. by W.J.Strachan.  (Cambridge:  Chadwyck-Healey, 1977). 
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Architecture in 3D:  Anamorphosis 
 
Emptiness 
The opening quote proposed that painting and 
architecture are bound up with each other in certain 
stereognoses; and suggested that these knowledges 
notwithstanding, painting and architecture are bound up 
with illusion, the nemesis of knowledge.7  It summarises the 
previous chapter, ‘Marginal Comments’, where Lacan 
introduced architecture in the discussion of anamorphism, 
in other words, in a discussion of the role and function of 
projection, and insists that the development of 
architecture is tied to the development of painting.  
‘There is behind it [anamorphism, the meaning of 
anamorphism] the whole history of architecture as well as 
that of painting, their combination and the history of this 
combination.’  He proposes that architecture like 
perspective painting ‘can be defined as something organised 
around emptiness’[S7, p135]; and later, in the chapter ‘The 
Death of God’, that architecture enters the symbolic order 
by a process of ‘primitive sublimation’[S7 p175]. 
This emptiness and its subsequent sublimation bears 
some scrutiny because if it is not trivial, it is 
enigmatic.  Teasing out the different iterations of this 
emptiness in Lacan’s text and in architectural discourse is 
the main function of this paper.  We assume that although 
it may be related to the simple and obvious fact that both 
the lines of a one-point perspective and the lines of the 
nave of a church – to which one-point perspective has its 
paradigmatic application in the work of, say, Brunelleschi 
– enclose empty space, this cannot be the whole of its 
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meaning.  For Lacan tells us that this emptiness and 
Holbein’s death’s head anamorphosis are related to Freud’s 
Das Ding, the thing, ‘the Freudian Thing’. 
In the first place, we might ask about this title, why 
marginal?  Margins of psychoanalysis?  Marginally 
important?  Marginal as pertaining to edges, contours, 
walls, the enclosures, of spaces and forms?  Marginal as a 
(military) strategy, as a way to get a better fix on the 
centre (in order to hit a bullseye, you have to stand back 
from your target)?  Like Derrida’s Margins.  Marginal in 
that they concern art, religion and science which all dance 
around a central something (real, unattainable) called the 
Freudian Thing?  Art represses, religion displaces, and 
science repudiates the Freudian Thing, all of which tropes 
are different forms of sublimation.[S7 pp129, 134]8 
We know where this is heading.  Dispense with the 
conclusion now, so that we can trace an anamorphic line.  
By glancing forward, we may relate this emptiness, this 
thing, to the articulation of desire in the Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis:  to the blind spot 
in the visual field, that which in vision always escapes 
vision.  We posit that which escapes desire in the 
architectural field; and ask how desire as it manifests 
architecturally remains unsatisfied in architecture.  This 
paper thus presages the concept of architectural desire:  
an architectural blind spot, lack, objet a, or simply, 
shortcoming, which signifies desire. 
This glance reveals a shift in Lacan’s thought in the 
four years between Seminars 7 and 11.  In 7 Lacan says that 
architecture and painting are organised around emptiness.  
In the discussion of the visual field in Seminar 11, he has 
all but ceased talking about architecture.  And emptiness 
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has been replaced by the blind spot, scotoma.  It is as if 
he now regards only painting as the proper instantiation 
and representation of the field of vision, but not 
architecture.  (Architecture does not represent space, it 
is space.)  This paper will not pursue this shift in 
Lacan’s thought, except to resist it.  This paper is 
possible only if architecture is representation; and it is 
difficult to understand how, on Lacan’s terms, architecture 
can be stripped of this role.  For in the intensely 
reflective, paranoid, and hallucinatory register in which 
Lacan’s thought exists, everything is representation. 
First, Seminar 7.  The Thing is associated with desire 
and the real, that which is beyond symbolisation and 
imagery, which is the object of the tuché (the sneeze) or 
missed encounter with the real, and which is always 
screened by words and images in the process of repetition.  
I jump again to the language of The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis because Evans tells us that the 
Thing is not used again after Seminar 7.9  It is replaced by 
the lost object in later Seminars, and by the objet petit a 
in ‘The Transference and the Drives’  In Seminar 7, Das 
Ding is ‘the beyond-of-the signified’ (a nod to Kant and 
things-in-themselves)10.  The subject’s relation to it is 
‘characterised by primary effect, prior to any repression’. 
[S7p54]  It is thus not unconscious material, which Lacan 
maintains is a function of language i.e. symbolisation, and 
whose main entry point to the unconscious is through 
repression.  In the same context, it is referred to as ‘the 
primary object’ which ‘failed to give satisfaction’, and is 
related to desire and the pleasure principle. 
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 The drive is always a return 
journey. 
 
In Seminar 7, the Thing 
is involved in a similar 
hydraulics of desire as that 
of the objet a.  In connection 
with the pleasure principle:  
‘That is Das Ding insofar as, 
if he is to follow the path of 
his pleasure, man must go 
around it’.[S7p95]  In 
connection with art:  ‘it 
being understood that a work 
of art always involves 
encircling the Thing’.[S7p141]  It functions in the same 
ways as the aim, or object of desire, which is that 
unknowable object which the drive circles around but never 
attains.  The drive is always a return journey.  For 
instance, in connection with the oral drive, Lacan 
describes its aim as ‘the presence of a hollow, a void, 
which can be occupied by any object and whose agency we 
know only on the form of the lost object, the petit a.  The 
objet a is not the origin of the oral drive.  It is not 
introduced as the original food, it is introduced from the 
fact that no food will ever satisfy the oral drive, except 
by circumnavigating the eternally lacking object.’ [FFCP 
pp179-80] 
Architecture is organised around emptiness in the same 
way that the drives circle around the objet a.  This 
emptiness manifests in the visual world of architecture, 
which architecture can never fill.  It might enclose this 
emptiness literally, in the sense that if architecture is 
about creating enclosure – usually with walls, usually to 
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protect its inhabitants from beasts and murderers – then 
this enclosure encloses emptiness.  Except that if it is 
literal, then the emptiness must always escape, like the 
tomato seed which always skitters away when we put our 
finger on it.  And if not literally, then the architecture 
activity, (the will to architecture corresponding to the 
thrust of the drive), then this activity is itself a double 
gesture, both a compulsive acknowledgement and screening 
out of originary loss and traumatic encounter with the 
real.  It will remain unresolved at this point, how 
literally or metaphorically we are entitled to take the 
enclosing function of architecture.  We merely point out 
now that Lacan’s text is always in several registers, and 
we leave ambiguous for the moment the two registers:  
architecture as enclosing emptiness and architecture as 
circling an originary lost object. 
Lacan’s argument continues with an 
historical/analogical account:  Architecture’s role is 
subsequently taken over by painting, a role which it fully 
achieved with the invention of perspective.  At certain 
moments, classical architecture attempts to recapture the 
role taken over by painting, by making use of the devices 
of perspective.  With the invention of anamorphism several 
hundred years after perspective, the illusionism that had 
been perspective is shown to be what it really is, a 
signifier for some other hidden reality which emerges from 
behind illusion.  The surprise/shock/interest provoked by 
anamorphism signifies the real the way the disgust of shit, 
as opposed to shit itself, signifies the real.  Anamorphism 
is related to, or is an act of, sublimation, which is an 
effect of the way the signifier (the symbolic order) 
screens us from the real.  By a kind of sublimation which 
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 An originary architecture, 
Absalon, Cellule No.1, 1992 
harks back to Hegel’s 
Aufhebung, the illusionism 
which was embedded in the 
imaginary order, enters 
the symbolic. 
 It is worth quoting 
The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis at length 
because Lacan offers an 
account of primitive 
architecture which, by its august and originary tone, its 
invocation of teleology and necessity, places his writing 
within the tradition of origins to which the primitive hut, 
architecture’s myth of origins, belongs.  The primitive hut 
is always empty, not just because it awaits its first 
occupants, but because it is self-referential.  Laugier’s 
hut is not an essay in occupation, but in the inter-
relation of architectural components.  Occupation comes 
later, as something outside and accidental to the essential 
work of architecture.  Hegel’s account of the originary 
architecture speaks of a corresponding emptiness, in a 
similarly sonorous tone.  Further, his account of the 
succession of the arts is a gloss on Lacan’s history of 
architecture - the passing of the baton of emptiness, first 
to painting, then to language. 
 
This object [anamorphism] could never have been produced, never 
have had a necessary meaning without a whole preceding 
development.  There is behind it the whole history of 
architecture as well as that of painting, their combination and 
the history of this combination. 
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…[P]rimitive architecture can be defined as something organised 
around emptiness.  That is also the authentic impression that the 
forms of a cathedral like Saint Mark’s gives us, and it is the 
true meaning of all architecture.  Then subsequently, for 
economic reasons [because it is cheaper?], one is satisfied with 
painting images of that architecture, one learns to paint 
architecture on the walls of architecture; and painting, too, is 
first of all something that is organised around emptiness.  Since 
it is a matter of finding once more the sacred emptiness of 
architecture in the less marked medium of painting, the attempt 
is made to create something that resembles it more and more 
closely, that is to say, perspective is discovered.11 
…. 
From the moment that perspective was discovered in painting, a 
form of architecture appears that adopts the perspectivism of 
painting….  Go and see Palladio’s theatre in Vicenze,….  Neo-
classical architecture submits itself to the laws of perspective, 
plays with them, and makes them its own.  That is, it places them 
[the laws] inside of something [architecture] that was done in 
painting in order to find once again the emptiness of primitive 
architecture. 
 
From that point on one is entangled in a knot which seems to flee 
increasingly from the meaning of this emptiness.  …[T]he Baroque 
return to the play of forms, to all manner of devices, including 
anamorphosis, is an effort to restore the true meaning of 
artistic enquiry; artists use the discovery of the property of 
lines to make something emerge that is precisely there where one 
has lost one’s bearings or, strictly speaking, nowhere. 
 
Rubens’ painting that suddenly appears in the place of the 
unintelligible image reveals what is at issue here.  At issue, in 
an analogical or anamorphic form, is the effort to point once 
again to the fact that what we seek in the illusion is something 
in which the illusion as such in some way transcends itself, 
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destroys itself, by demonstrating that it is only there as a 
signifier. 
 
And it is this which lends primacy to the domain of language 
above all, since with language we only ever have to do with the 
signifier….[S7 pp135-6] 
 
In The Aesthetics,12 Hegel writes, ‘The first of the 
particular arts…, is architecture considered as a fine art.  
Its task lies in so manipulating external inorganic nature 
that it becomes cognate to mind, as an artistic outer 
world.’  (In cognate to mind, there is implicit the idea 
that architecture is in a narcissistic relation to its 
subject.)  It is afflicted with a species of emptiness 
which is beyond the contingent emptiness of an unoccupied 
building.  ‘In this material and in such forms, the ideal 
as concrete spirituality does not admit of begin realised.  
Hence the reality which is represented in them remains 
contrasted with the Idea, as something external which it 
has not penetrated, or has penetrated only to establish an 
abstract relation.’  Hegel’s originary architecture is 
empty because Spirit is not yet in it.  Architecture 
conforms to generic rules of composition (symmetry) and 
physics, and it is still mired in its materiality, like 
Lacan’s Thing, which he calls a brute ‘dumb 
reality’[S7p54].  Spirit is not yet embodied in the forms 
of architecture, the way they will be, first in classical 
Greek sculpture and then in Renaissance painting.  It is an 
empty temple awaiting the entry of God in a ‘lightning-
flash of individuality’.13 
For the Lacan of Seminar 7, anamorphosis recalls a 
psychic prior reality screened by architecture and 
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perspective, a priority which seems to be both temporal and 
logical.  With anamorphism, architecture and perspective 
enter the symbolic order, which relates this screening 
function to what Lacan will later call repetition (the 
return of the real as an encounter with nonsense or horror) 
and the automaton (the screen of signifiers, which screens 
the encounter with the real).14  Hegel’s architecture 
represents a degree zero of Spirit, a condition of 
Spiritual entropy before matter is fully formed into an art 
in which we can recognise Spirit.  Architecture is empty of 
Spirit.  In this sense, architecture is keeping something 
out.  Hegel’s sublimation (Aufhebung) is the engine which 
drives the succession of the particular arts.  Kojève 
defines aufhebung as ‘to annul or destroy’ and ‘to preserve 
or carry forward’.  Each particular art is destroyed, 
replaced, preserved by the next one, so that even poetry, 
the last of the arts and the acme of Spiritual expression, 
carries within it the hard empty kernel of architecture.  
Architecture… memorial to the Spiritually bereft, to Death, 
to ultimate loss.  For Hegel, architecture becomes the 
emptiness carried forward in languages.  Architecture the 
unutterable.  For Lacan, it is in the act of sublimation of 
anamorphosis-as-image by anamorphosis-as-signifier, that we 
are reminded of the unutterable real which architecture and 
perspective circle around. 
 
Baltrusaitis and Anamorphism 
Lacan introduces anamorphism with three examples taken 
from Baltrusaitis.  1)The vanitas anamorphism in Holbein’s 
The Ambassadors.  ‘It looks roughly like fried 
eggs’[S7p135]; ‘…the effect of an erection’[4FCPA p88].  
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2)An 18 metre long fresco in a chapel built in Descartes 
time.  Both of which only become recognisable images when 
viewed from marginal positions.  And 3)an anamorphic copy 
of a Rubens’ crucifixion, which is organised around a 
cylindrical mirror. 
• About the Holbein:  ‘The pleasure is found in seeing 
its emergence from an indecipherable form.’[S7p135]  
This is also the pleasure of psychoanalysis.  Lacan 
introduces anamorphism in a way which suggests the 
exegesis of unconscious material in a visual, as 
opposed to verbal, psychoanalysis.  As if visual 
material might hide something, thereby having an 
unconscious dimension.15 
 
• About the Rubens copy:  ‘It is formed of a polished 
cylinder…, and around it you put a kind of bib or flat 
surface on which there are also indecipherable 
lines…[Y]ou see the image…emerge in the cylindrical 
mirror.’  It recalls the lamella which defines the rim 
structure of the drives (the flat seminal homme-lette, 
Descartes’ little man, spittle of the erogenous zones) 
from which the thrust emerges as a kind of distortion 
of its surface.  The whole thing is vaguely erotic.  
What emerges on this erect cylindrical mirror is an 
image of the crucifixion, Christ’s lithe limp erect 
agonised body. 
 
• About the chapel:  ‘you can see for a brief moment the 
extraordinarily dispersed lines come together and 
perceive the body of the scene.’  Like the mirror image 
brings together into a coherent image the 
discombobulated body of the infant. 
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The Ambassadors 
What initially attracts is the sumptuous rendition of 
expensive equipment and other worldly goods.  (For the men 
who have everything.)  The death’s head image is put into 
relation with these goods.  Because of the projections, one 
can only either see the goods or the skull, but never both 
together.  The smear seems to hover in front, not behind, 
the space.  Lacan compares it to an erection and to seminal 
fluid.  (Imagine the instant this photograph was taken:  
the artist is about to strut in front of his painting, 
preceded by a massive erection).  Death is the ultimate 
loss.  So the smear16, associated with desire and the body, 
the erogenous zones, appears as a screen in front of the 
painting, like Parrhasios’ curtain, and not behind it.  And 
death, the ultimate loss - objet a – only appears on the 
oblique view, the view you get when you try to peer behind 
the painting to see what it veils. 
Anamorphism also illustrates literally how optical 
projection which defines the world transparent to our 
vision can become opaque when it undergoes the distortions 
associated with desire and death.  The smear seems to cover 
an area of the pictorial space, and only becomes 
transparent again when the skull appears.  This is not a 
matter of unfogging the glass, but of changing position.  
The lesson of anamorphism is that no matter where we are 
positioned in a space, there is another position in space 
which we might occupy, from which point everything as we 
see it now, would be anamorphic.  Anamorphism reminds us 
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that there is always another point of view, another take on 
things, from the position of an Other, which is invisible 
or opaque to us.  Said the jilted lover, ‘You never look at 
me from the place from which I see you’.17  It is associated 
literally and metaphorically with desire, for position, 
vector, and spin of the viewer are indicators of desire. 
Rubens copy 
The cylindrical catoptric anamorphism is a species of 
optical device.  It has affinities to architecture.  Unlike 
the other examples which remain flat on the canvas, this 
one is produced by elements distributed in 3-dimensional 
space:  a vertical cylinder (caryatid) and a horizontal 
surface (plinth).  They set up relationships with each 
other.  The fact that they are primarily optical only means 
that they do not explore the full range of relationships 
that obtain in an architecture;  this device is a model of 
architecture and not a full fledged building. 
Christ leaps out of the primordial soup, like 
Botticelli’s Venus.  The vertical cylinder transforms the 
drawing into something readable – visible and intelligible 
– the way the elevation of a building transforms the plan 
into something visible and inhabitable.  It is a vision 
machine, in that it makes visible what had been invisible.  
It is an analogue of creation, in that it transforms a 
formless mass of colour and swirling lines, into a well-
formed object that stands up in a space.  It traverses 
painting from abstraction to figuration and from figuration 
to illusion. 
 The Rubens copy demonstrates that anamorphism is a 3-
dimensional painting, because it is constituted by a 
distortion or swelling in the visual field.  A visual image 
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literally stands up; in order for it to be intelligible, it 
has to stand up.  This is not a distortion of the image 
(Photoshop™ image-stretching functions are actually not 
what anamorphism is about, even though the effect may be 
the same).  Like the tower scene in VERTIGO, in which Jimmy 
Stewart’s fear of heights and desire for Kim Novak 
manifests as a simultaneous elongation and flattening of 
cameraspace, anamorphism is a distortion of the visual 
field itself, in so far as that field is a function of 
projection.  This may be more obvious in the case of the 
cylindrical mirror, but the same thing happens with the 
vanitas skull.  In that case, the area of the picture plane 
upon which the skull is projected rotated into the third 
dimension.  The plane upon which 3-dimensional space is 
represented rotates, or otherwise moves, into 3-dimensional 
space.  The picture plane is an opaque surface which may 
appear transparent, but only from certain privileged 
angles.18 
The Minim Bros. Chapels 
 Lacan says very 
little about the 
chapels, the images 
of which are 
reproduced from the 
plates of optical 
treatises by Jean-François Niceron, and his 
contemporaries.19  They show paintings projected obliquely 
onto the chapel walls of ‘a convent of the Minim Friars in 
Rome as well as Paris’ so as to form anamorphic paintings 
of the Saints.20  These images are important because of 
their visual import to Lacan’s argument.21 
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The anamorphic Saints are produced in an unusual way.  
Anamorphism is a species of projective geometry.  It is the 
general case of projection through a plane, of which 
perspective projection is one limit.  In this case the 
plane is set perpendicular to the principal line of 
projection, Alberti’s prince of rays, the throne of vision.  
In the case of the vanitas skull, the plane of projection 
was rotated to an oblique angle to the prince of rays.  In 
the Minim chapel engravings, the anamorphism is produced 
indirectly.  A portrait of a Saint is shown mounted 
perpendicular to 
the chapel wall and 
is then projected 
from the eye point 
so that it streaks 
the wall obliquely.  
In other words, the 
anamorphism is produced by the transfer of an image from 
one plane to another.  Anamorphism is presented as a 
relationship of picture planes set at angles to each other, 
one normal, one oblique, the latter of which happens to be 
architecture.  The former way, links perspective and 
anamorphism in a continuum, but links it to a solitary 
projection point and plane; the latter involves anamorphism 
in a series of inter-projecting image planes.  Whilst the 
former may suggest, although by no means entails, a species 
of prioritised Cartesian subject; the latter makes 
graphically explicit a universe of displaced images screens 
and multiple projection points, which will be sympathetic 
to the diagram of the scopic field, Lacan’s operational 
montage, when he developes it 4 years later. 
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 These chapel walls also begin to explain the unusual 
relation which Lacan posits between painting and 
architecture, as if painting were a paper thin liner on its 
interior walls.  In the Niceron engravings, the images are 
literally projected upon the walls.  In 
Lacan’s account, architecture and 
painting are linked in an interactive 
exchange based on imitation, which 
becomes plausible when they are 
superimposed with such optical precision.  
First painting imitates architecture.  Then, when painting 
discovers perspective and can finally get it right, i.e. 
when painting has discovered the laws (stereognoses) which 
governed architecture (architecture’s unconscious), 
architecture starts to imitate painting.  It becomes 
possible for architecture to represent itself, as if its 
two-dimensional image were slide-projected upon its walls. 
Apart from the intimation that painting is the ego 
image of architecture, and painting’s history its 
psychoanalysis – in which the unconscious material of 
architecture is exposed, followed by a kind of transference 
- two related things are at work here.  At this point 
(Brunelleschi, the early renaissance), architecture has 
passed into the discourse of representation.  Architecture 
no longer merely encloses emptiness, or makes space:  it 
represents it.  This is a kind of mirror stage in the 
development of architecture, by which it enters the 
imaginary order.  As if architecture might be at one and 
the same time architecture and the representation of 
architecture.  The second point: this representational 
architecture is a symptom of the fact that in a world of 
optical projection (one-eyed, stationary) inaugurated by 
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the discovery of one-point perspective projection, there is 
an equivalence between 2- and 3- dimensional space; such 
that perspective is a 2-dimensional representation of a 3-
dimensional space, and architecture is a 3-dimensional 
representation of a 2-dimensional space.  Lacan does not 
say this, but it is a function of perspective projection, 
and it will have bearing on the characteristics of the 
scopic field, what I provisionally call the flattening of 
the screen, which we will enter later. 
If we transfer the lesson in Lacan’s discussion of 
anamorphism to architecture, then if architecture is 
organised around emptiness, it is not because it encloses 
emptiness, but because this architecture, like the picture 
surface with which it is identified, holds the emptiness 
out.  (Do not interpret organised around too literally as 
encloses.)  Emptiness aka the Thing lurks just behind the 
surface of the imaginary register, of which the picture 
plane is an analogue.  The image we have perpetrated is 
that in the case of anamorphosis, the picture plane peels 
up or cracks, which threatens to reveal the reality 
outside.  If we are unlucky, we might glimpse the real with 
a sidelong glance.  There are other properties of an 
architecture which holds the real out:  it is an 
architecture of pure surface, which cannot contemplate an 
underneath, a behind the coat of paint, because behind that 
coat of paint is the unimaginable.  It must always only 
ever offer to view, more surface, even when the surface is 
scratched. 
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 Piranesi 
In another register altogether, the register where the 
problem of architecture is a problem of language, Piranesi 
explored the emptiness of an architecture understood as a 
surface of representation.  In the façade of Santa Maria 
Del Priorato or the walls of Piazza dei Cavalieri, the hard 
brittle detailing is set off against a palimpsest-like 
featureless substrate as if to indicate that the detailing 
is to be understood as a surface effect of language, with 
no structural, formal or geometric relationship to its 
substrate. 
 
In the Vedute di 
Roma, Piranesi 
presents a shambolic 
and falling down 
classicism scattered 
amidst the modern 
fabric of Rome.22  In 
‘Entrance to the 
Villa Sette Bassi’, a 
Corinthian portal is 
little more than the 
rubble infill once 
the cladding has fallen off.  The architecture is literally 
a crumbling screen of limestone signifiers.  Underneath is 
a reality which the language cannot contemplate because it 
has no means to acknowledge it.  The monuments of Rome are 
shown to be only skin deep, about 50mm of limestone 
cladding.  The real site of the classical language, the 
coveted solicited classicism, so structured so hard so 
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precise, so much the origin and foundation of the 
architecture of modern Rome, are the informé23 steaming 
clots of undifferentiated lumpen masonry which are strewn 
all over via Appia, like Lacan’s dumb reality.  In ‘The 
Lamella of David Lynch’, Slavoj Zizek24 aligns the real with 
the interior of the body.  He cites the slimy ecto-bits 
which explode from the stomach in Aliens, which remain 
beyond what can be described in words and images, the 
symptom of which is the sense of horror they provoke.  This 
is the lesson of Piranesi’s Rome.  What lies beneath the 
surface of architecture is an unstructured, 
undifferentiated, unarticulated reality. 
There is a double gesture in Piranesi’s work which 
distinguish his engravings from those of his 
contemporaries.  Architecture is projected forward as a 
paper thin language system, at the same time it is 
retracted into a prelingual state of lumpenness.  The 
symbolic order is exposed as a decorative effect upon the 
real.25  Of course Piranesi’s paper prints are screens too.  
The ruins do not really look like this.  They are an effect 
of representation, and of the social conventions, ways of 
seeing, and other agitations of a sweaty mind; all of which 
structure representation. 
                                                
7   stereo-, having or dealing with the three dimensions of 
space, or involving viewing with two eye pieces (as in a 
stereoscope), to get the effect of depth. 
-gnosis, knowledge, recognition (Webster’s 7th New Collegiate).  
Thus stereognosis is either 3D knowledge or 2-eyed knowledge, 
which are not necessarily the same.  Most of Lacan’s examples are 
from the tradition of perspective representation (painting and 
optics), which assume the single eye.  This bifurcation, so 
noted, is the beginning of an argument that the scopic field is 
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not to be equated with the visual field, meaning the (two-eyed) 
visual world we are always in, nor that architecture should be 
understood as a built version of the scopic field, as image 
producing machine; although both scopic field and visual 
world/architecture are obviously related.  For instance, one of 
the salient features of our visual field is that we are always 
moving in it; and one type of blind spot which Lacan does not 
countenance, is the thickening of the screen associated with 
speed, although desire is frequently associated with movement, 
and the drives are understood to travel around their object.  The 
question of the relation of architecture or perspective to the 
scopic field is ambiguous in Lacan’s text, as it is never clear 
whether Lacan uses them as metaphors for mental structures, or 
examples of psychoanalytic readings offered by way of example, 
etc.  We will return to the question of metaphor later in this 
paper. 
8   Both The Ambassadors and Las Meninas displace interest from 
the centre of the painting (prince of rays, vanishing point, 
gaze) to the periphery, where the most significant elements occur 
(the skull, the light which animates the reflected space).  ‘[I]n 
its relation to desire, reality appears only as marginal.’ [4FCPA 
p.108] 
9  Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis.  (London:  Routledge, 1996) 
10   Kant says that positing things-in-themselves is a logical 
conclusion of the ways we think about and represent objects in 
space and time, although 1) we can by definition never know them, 
and 2) they are consequently of no use to us whatsoever and thus 
not the objects of a legitimate enquiry.  It is tempting to 
equate things-in-themselves with the Thing, especially as Lacan 
seems to (S7p55), but they are in totally different registers:  
one is a logical, the other a psychic boundary.  At best there 
could be a correspondence. 
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11   This is the perspective by incremental approximation 
account of the development of perspective, as in John White, The 
Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space.  (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 1987). First published 1957. 
12   Although it is not known how familiar Lacan was with 
Hegel’s Aesthetics, these topics are also covered in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, with which Lacan was familiar through 
Kojève’s lectures.  Fragments of his course were compiled in 
Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel:  lectures 
on the phenomenology of Spirit, transl. by James Nichols, edited 
by Allan Bloom, assembled by Raymond Queneau (New York:  Basic 
Books, 1969). 
13   Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, (London:  
Penguin Classics, 1993), Bernard Bosanquet, trans., pp.90-91. 
14   See chapter 5, ‘The Tuché and the Automaton’ in The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis.  See also Hal Foster’s 
gloss on this in The Return of the Real.  (Cambridge, MA:  MIT 
Press, 1999). Pp. 132-38. 
15   For which see Rosalind Krauss, The Optical Unconscious.  
(Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1993), pp. 33-93 for the dialectic of 
revealing and concealing in the work of, e.g., Duchamp and Max 
Ernst. 
16   The anamorphism looks as if Holbein smeared his paint by 
Freudian slop (sic), or in frustration and passion.  It then 
dried.  It suggests that the visual world is material, not 
abstract and transparent, but thick and gooey, rather like oil 
paint. 
17   4FCPA, p.103.  Italicised in the original.  The full quote 
is ‘When, in love, I solicit a look, what is profoundly 
unsatisfying and always missing is that - You never look at me 
from the place from which I see you’  The desire to close this 
gap would remain unfulfilled even if you were looking in the 
mirror, and the love was self love. 
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18   Anamorphic architectures are highly inflected by fear and 
desire, and other strong emotions.  The most obvious examples are 
haunted houses, which are literally animated by psychic forces.  
Doors slam, floors seem strangely out of kilter, walls swell, 
there is a sense of being gazed at.  The haunted house is a good 
example of Lacanian sublimation.  In The Haunting of Hill House, 
the swelling of a wall is not only a visual image.  There is 
nothing scary about a swelling wall, per se.  The degree to which 
it is scary is the degree to which it signifies the presence of 
spirits. 
19   Jean-François Niceron, La Perspective Curieuse.  (Paris:  
Jean Du Puis, 1638).  Revised, translated into Latin, and 
republished with better plates as Thaumaturgus Opticus.  (Paris:  
Jean Du Puis, 1646) 
20   Not clear what the ‘as well as Paris’ referred to, until I 
discovered that he was quoting from a picture caption in 
Baltrusaïtis.  Lacan was standing in front of the class reading 
out of the book and got a little ahead of himself. This is a 
textual punctum, a moment of recognition which seems to slice 
through the media of representation to a past present moment.  
Lacan slipped up a couple of times.  He mis-locates The 
Ambassadors to the Louvre, and mis-identifies the Minim chapel as 
Jesuit.  Anamorphism is a species of visual joke, a kind of 
interior ha ha, which can be lumped together with jokes, puns, 
slips-of-the-tongue, and all the other psychic detritus which 
Freud shows us to be the screen of the unconscious, in The 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life. 
21   Marcel Duchamp was also very interested in Niceron’s work 
on projection in connection with Etant Donnés:  1. la chute 
d’eau, 2. le gaz d’éclairage (1946-66), which is about a certain 
stereognosis.  Duchamp builds a 3-dimensional (literal depth) 
perspective (phenomenal depth) for two eyes, thus mobilising 
paralax and depth of field. 
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22   John Wilton-Ely, The Mind and Art of Giovanni Battista 
Piranesi.  (London:  Thames and Hudson, 1978).  Wilton-Ely 
contains the complete plates of the Vedute and the Carceri.  
Piranesi is an easy one, because the body of work is so vast, and 
so full of symptoms.  Piranesi was involved in a vicious polemic 
conducted at the level of language, about the origin of Roman 
classicism in Etruscan or Greek architecture.  Piranesi supported 
Etruscan as the foundation for a cultural hegemony and priority 
of Roman classicism over Greece. 
23   The concept of the informé.  See Bataille’s informé.  See 
also Lacan’s homme-lette, which forms the rim (as in anus), the 
site of the drives, which occupies the site of his erogenous 
zones. 
24   In Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink, and Maire Jaanus, 
editors, Reading Seminar XI:  Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psychoanalysis.  (Albany:  SUNY Press, 1995), pp.205-220. 
25   More or less what Tafuri described as a two-pronged attack 
on language and abstraction.  Tafuri called him the evil genius 
on account of his demolition job on language.  See Manfredo 
Tafuri, The Sphere and the Labyrinth:  avant-gardes and 
architecture from Piranesi to the 1970’s, (Cambridge, MA:  MIT 
Press, 1987), pp.25-54, in which he defines operations on 
language as the project of the avant-garde.  Many people were in 
the Vedute business in 18th century Rome, but only Piranesi was 
able to convey a sense of the emerging malevolence and horror 
which lurks beneath this (architectural) language.  In the 
engravings of e.g. Vasi, Paninni or Canaletto, the ruins are 
restored or romanticised to convey a sense of melancholy or 
nostalgia. 
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Architecture in 2D:  trompe-l’œil 
 
Zeuxis and Parrhasios 
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 
Zeuxis and Parrhasios have a paintoff to determine which of 
them is the best painter.  Apparently in ancient Greece, 
this means the most illusionistic painter.  Zeuxis goes 
first.  He paints a still life:  when he unveils it, birds 
try to eat the grapes.  When Zeuxis tries to unveil 
Parrhasios’ painting, the veil turns out to be painted.  
Zeuxis could fool the birds, Parrhasios could fool a 
painter.26  The painting turns out to be a veil (is a veil a 
still life?), which is what Alberti said 2000 years later.  
Ryman’s pure white paintings have the same aspiration.27  
They expose painting as a veil.  The white ground signifies 
not only the limitless possibilities for representation but 
points out that every painting conceals a piece of the 
visual world.  Every painting is also a blank spot.  Most 
painting tries to hide this fact by being so full of life.  
The white walls of the gallery conspire with painting.  The 
neutrality of the white wall suggests that there is nothing 
significant behind the painting for the painting to 
conceal. 
The whiteness of Ryman’s paintings signifies that it 
is a blank.  A painting blank or template, like any 
template, is both empty and full of possibilities.  In this 
sense, Parrhasios painted the first white painting.  
Analogously, a blank or white architecture would be empty.  
It would proclaim its allegiance to the cultural discourse 
of whiteness through its originary status.  It is important 
to distinguish this white architecture from white walls.  
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Again white walls are a kind of decoy.  White walls do not 
an empty architecture make.  Such an originary architecture 
might not have white walls, but it would have white space.  
It would be empty the way Hegel’s originary architecture is 
empty of Spirit, inert, the opposite of haunted.  It would 
not be featureless, it would not be stripped of its 
individuating characteristics (Parrhasios’ veil had folds 
like Leonardo’s drapery studies; Ryman’s work is rich with 
tapings brushings and other framing devices) but it would 
expose architecture’s originary devices.  It would be a 
blank, so that it could be full of generative 
possibilities.  It is easy to see the stripped down forms 
of Absalon’s Cells28 in this light; we are perhaps only a 
little less conditioned now to see Laugier’s neo-classical 
primitive hut - reduced to posts and rafters - in the same 
light.29  We have to ask what this emptiness of architecture 
is. 
We might look a little more closely at the emptiness 
of Parrhasios’ veil.  In Zeuxis’ painting the birds are 
fooled because the grapes are not there.  Painted grapes 
are not grapes.  In this sense, representation signifies 
the absence of what is represented.  The same could be said 
about Parrhasios’ painting.  Zeuxis is fooled because the 
curtain is not there.  The painted curtain signifies the 
absence of a real curtain.  The difference – and here we 
get into one of those conundrums of self-reference - is 
that the curtain is blank:  in other words, it is a blank.  
Like Ryman’s white blanks, Parrhasios’ painting is not 
concealing anything because it is not representing 
anything.30  Whereas the painted grapes signify the absence 
of a presence (grapes), the painted painting is still a 
painting, it signifies the presence of an absence 
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 The presence of an absence 
(painting).  If there is anything which the curtain could 
be said to be concealing, it would be a painting, and a 
painting – as representation – signifies an absence.  To 
reiterate, Zeuxis thought he was looking at the absence of 
a painting, i.e. a real curtain covering a painting; it 
turned out to be the absence of a curtain, i.e. a real 
painting. 
 In the same 
sense, an 
architecture which 
represents itself, 
like Lacan’s 
projected 
architecture, might 
disappear behind its 
representation.  
Such an architecture 
would signify the 
presence of an absence.  Works which intentionally 
problematise representation, like the monumental blank 
framed façade panel of LeCorbusier’s Villa Schwob, proclaim 
their own absence.31  Although it is not possible to make 
formal generalisations, we might look for symptoms of this 
phenomenon in the empty façade or the excessively 
repetitive one, which effect an erasure.32 
 In ‘What is a picture’, Lacan distinguishes ‘the 
natural function of the lure’ from ‘that of trompe-l’œil’, 
and concomitantly the response of the birds from that of 
Zeuxis.  The birds are hungry.  They respond to a basic 
instinct at the level of the body (Freud compares hunger to 
libido).  Their response has nothing to do with the 
illusionistic aspects of representation.  Whatever says 
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 Refraction through a denser 
medium 
grapes to birds ‘would have to 
be something more reduced, 
something closer to the sign’.  
Ducks will seek cover if a 
shadow passes over them, even 
though the shadow does not 
resemble that of a hawk.  
Zeuxis is a traveller in the 
imaginary register, in this he 
has one over on the birds.  He 
responds in a way that already 
implicates him in the economy 
of revealing and concealing, 
which is the mark of illusionistic representation.  Lacan 
says that he tried to pull back the veil of the visual 
field to see what was hidden behind, which Lacan defines as 
the objet a, the absent object which is the aim of desire, 
but which never satisfies desire.  This is the absence 
which, in its different manifestations, motivates all the 
drives.  (The thrust of the drive is always a return 
journey.)  His response is telling for it acknowledges the 
status of the visual world as a screen for originary loss.  
Imagine if, following Zeuxis, following Alberti, everyone’s 
impulse in the presence of a painting was to look behind 
it.  This is Lacan’s point, that every perspective, like 
the imaginary register of which it is a homologue, is a 
veil. 
Lacan says that you don’t deceive someone by showing 
him a painting of grapes, you deceive him by showing him a 
‘painting of a veil,…something which incites him to ask 
what is behind it’.  The point of trompe-l’œil painting is 
not to give ‘an illusory equivalence of the object’, i.e. 
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to fool us about grapes, but to fool us about painting.  
‘[P]ainting pretends to be something other than what it 
is’.  We think it is a curtain, in fact it is a painting.  
This is evidenced by the fact that the pleasure of trompe-
l’œil is the surprise of discovering that you were fooled 
when the representation does not move with your point of 
view.  ‘For it appears at that moment as something other 
than it seemed, or rather it now seems to be that something 
else….  This something else is the objet petit a.’[4FCPA 
p112] 
Lacan is thinking of architectural trompe-l’œil, where 
a wall is painted as the seamless continuation of a space. 
This relates to the painted walls in Lacan’s history of 
architecture (Seminar 7).  This is the case where the 
illusion is most markedly destroyed when you move out of 
position, for the painted lines no longer align with the 
built ones.  When an architectural trompe-l’œil is seen 
from the wrong angle, the space appears to have refracted 
through a thicker medium.  It ana-morphs.  The moment we 
move from our preferred position in the Hall of 
Perspectives, and realise that porch and view of Rome are 
illusions, is the moment they signify the opacity of our 
transparent visual field, behind which hides the real.33 
Most stage spaces are a little anamorphed; Lacan 
mentions the most famous and most self-consciously 
classical one, Palladio’s Teatro Olympico in Vicenza.  One 
of the few anamorphic spaces to straddle the imaginary line 
between reality and representation, and hence one of the 
most disturbing, is the choir of Bramante’s Santa Maria 
Presso San Satiro in Milan (1486) which is a kind of 
perspective painting in high relief.  The total depth of 
the choir, which looks from the entry to be about ten 
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metres deep, is about half a metre.  Viewed from the altar, 
it is almost morphed beyond recognition, like Holbein’s 
vanitas.34  These spaces place the laws of perspective 
‘inside of something that was done in painting in order to 
find once again the emptiness of primitive architecture’.  
They are not identical with the spaces they represent. 
We now have two bifurcating possibilities both of 
which are functions of Lacan’s screen:  an absent 3-
dimensional architecture, absent behind what it represents, 
and which functions like the objet a in the field of 
architecture; and a trompe-l’œil architecture which 
signifies that the visual field is not transparent, but 
conceals something real.  The screen is the middle term 
between the eye and the gaze in the scopic field.  It is 
the opaque surface which carries spatial representations:  
it opens out onto a space (think Peruzzi); and it conceals 
the world (think Palladio).  This needs now to be related 
more directly to the discourse of representation. 
 
Architectural Discourse:  Literal and phenomenal 
transparency 
In their seminal article, Colin Rowe and Robert 
Slutzky delineated modernism in terms of two types of 
transparency, which has a bearing on the emptiness of 
Lacan’s architecture and the later development of the 
screen in the imaginary register.35  They distinguish the 
literal transparency of the glass walls and open floor 
plates of Gropius’s Dessau Bauhaus (1925-26), from the 
phenomenal transparency evinced by the facades and interior 
spaces of LeCorbusier’s Villa Stein at Garches (1927), in 
which two or more forms interpenetrate without optically 
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 Architecture and the 
representation of depth 
destroying each other.  The latter is related to the 
tendency in the still life paintings of, e.g., Leger and 
LeCorbusier, for the objects to share contours and 
therefore to oscillate between distribution in spatial 
depth and alignment on the picture plane.  Whilst the 
authors allow both Bauhaus and Garches to retain their 
status as icons of modern architecture, there is no doubt 
about which they consider to be more interesting.  The one 
has a transparency which resides in the material properties 
of glass; the other is conceptual, and occurs despite the 
materiality, and perhaps because of the opacity, of its 
constituents.  It is the mark of a reading event. 
Phenomenal transparency is the opposite of 
architectural tromp-l’œil painting.  Depth exists at the 
surface of the screen, not behind it.  Instead of what 
looks deep turning out to be flat, flatness turns out to 
have depth.  Phenomenal transparency is a kind of opacity 
in the field of vision, which occurs precisely when we 
cease to see the plane surface as transparent giving on to 
depth, and begin to see it as a 
screen.  The facades and spaces 
of Villa Stein seem to 
oscillate between these two 
conditions:  between a 
transparency which opens onto 
the presence of depth and an 
opacity which insists on its 
representation.  The literal 
transparency of glass modernism has an affinity to tromp-
l’œil where visual space is projected upon the plane 
surface of a wall.  The transparency of the Bauhaus is 
effected by seeing the interior through its elevations.  
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The optical (one-eyed) relationships in both cases are 
similar.  The difference between the Bauhaus and tromp-
l’œil is that the Bauhaus never ana-morphs and loses its 
transparency.  It never exploits this representational 
capacity of architecture. 
The screen in both Lacan (operational montage) and 
Freud (screen memories, dream façade) is not so simple as 
the plane surface involved in optical projection.  For 
Lacan’s and Freud’s screens have quite different properties 
from the slide projector screen.  The dreamer is not a 
projector and does not thereby project images onto a 
screen, nor does the dreamer look through a glass to the 
scene seen through the glass.  Rather the screen screens a 
reality which is otherwise unattainable.  The content of 
the dream is only accessible as facade.  The dream is like 
Piranesi’s monuments:  no matter how deeply they are 
gouged, we never see inside them, but only more surface.  
Unlike the façade of a building, it is not possible to step 
through it to inhabit the plan, and do all the things that 
architects do when they have free reign to explore a 
building, like locate the spaces which correspond to 
elements on the façade.  In the world of the dream, more 
analysis never leads inside the dream in the sense of 
passing through its façade into something else which 
corresponds to it, but only to more façade.  It is a short 
step from here to the register of the imaginary in which 
there is only ever the screen and to the visual world 
where, like Piranesi’s architecture of pure surface, 
everything is a surface for representation. 
We can blame the invention of perspective on the 
thickening of the screen and its delamination from the 
visual field, as if before the invention of perspective, 
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screen and field were one transparent thing.  Or perhaps 
before the invention of tromp-l’œil illusionism, but this 
was only possible in a systematic way once perspective was 
invented and whole architectural spaces could be treated 
illusionistically.  Any 2D representation of space – be it 
Peruzzi tromp-l’œil, pre-perspectival fresco by Giotto, or 
Ryman ‘blank’ – will screen what is behind it from view.  
This is the general quandary which representation finds 
itself in; and even transparencies like ‘The bride stripped 
bare…, Even’, must be understood in these terms.  When this 
representation is a perspective or photograph it becomes 
problematic, because of the systematic one-to-one 
correspondence between 2D surface and 3D visual field.  
This identity suggests that the visual field is always a 
screen; that it is opaque like the photograph or the 
painting.  Before the invention of perspective, the visual 
world was reality.  What you saw was what you got.  With 
the invention of perspective and the identification of the 
visual field with its representation on a 2-dimensional 
plane, the visual world becomes imaginary, with the screen 
screening a reality we know not.  It took 500 years after 
the invention of perspective for psychoanalysis to invent a 
subject which was adequate to this condition. 
The illusion of illusionism is not so much that we 
forget the opacity of the painted surface and think that we 
are looking at a real space, but that we forget the 
phenomenal opacity of the visual field itself.  We forget 
that lurking in the fringes of thought and consciousness is 
the terrifying possibility that the visual world is itself 
a screen, and that it screens something from our vision.  
In architecture, this illusion is perpetrated by surfaces 
with literal transparency.  It is an illusion foisted upon 
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us all the time, every time we look out a window, but 
particularly in certain works of modern architecture like 
the Bauhaus, whose spaces unfold as a matter of 
transparency.  The screen-like nature of the visual field – 
and of architecture which is its built form – only becomes 
apparent in moments of phenomenal transparency; moments 
when, standing before Villa Stein, the world becomes 
opaque. 
Not many architectures which are capable of 
entertaining this possibility, will entertain what lurks 
behind the screen.  LeCorbusier’s work does not indulge in 
this level of malevolence.  We saw how Piranesi’s Vedute 
exposed architecture’s status as a threatened and 
threatening surface.  It is arguable that he could only do 
this in the obsessive and agitated environment of the 
engravings where the architecture was already identified 
with the surface of representation (his engraved paper = 
its limestone cladding).  Other art forms higher up the 
Hegelian chain of aufhebung more readily contemplate this 
possibility.  In Stephen King’s novella The Langoliers, the 
langoliers are little spheres which race along the airport 
runway shredding the visual world under the wheels of the 
accelerating 747 like sheets of paper, revealing not the 
earth fill under the tarmac but an impenetrable black 
emptiness.  In Village of the Damned, George Sanders tries 
to keep the mind reading devil-children from penetrating 
his head so he can detonate his bomb.  He does it by 
imagining a wall.  The wall is crumbling visibly before 
their gaze.  Behind it, his mind’s eye, lurks psychic 
annihilation.36 
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 The flatness of depth 
 The opacity of the visual field predicated by 
LeCorbusier’s phenomenally transparent work is acknowledged 
at Garches by the thin strip of space which delaminates the 
façade libre from the plan.  This space announces that the 
façade floats, and is not a 
projection of the plan in the 
manner of, figuratively 
speaking, the renaissance façade 
or, literally speaking, the 
Bauhaus elevations.  The 
vertical depth relation 
(perpendicular to page, 
perpendicular to façade, the line of sight) is severed by a 
series of sharp shallow striations of space.  This space 
also announces that the façade has a phenomenal thickness, 
a thickness which exists as a visual reality, corresponding 
to but distinct from the literal but invisible thickness of 
the bearing wall masonry façade of, e.g., the renaissance 
palazzo. 
 
The screen and the flatness of depth 
We ended the discussion of the Minim chapel with the 
possibility of an equivalence between 2- and 3- dimensional 
space; such that perspective is a 2-dimensional 
representation of a 3-dimensional space, and architecture a 
3-dimensional representation of a 2-dimensional space.  
This is not belied by Lacan’s tripartite diagram of the 
structure of the scopic field, the operational montage 
which was achieved by montaging one perspective diagram 
inverted upon another.  On one reading, a viewing subject, 
is located opposite its object, with a screen in between.  
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The object is the gaze, which objectifies the subject.  By 
a related reading, the real (gaze) is located opposite the 
symbolic (the viewing subject, subject of language), with 
the imaginary (screen, bearer of images), in between.  
Students sometimes model it by setting up two slide 
projectors aimed either side of a back projection screen. 
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 
the screen is that which:   
• has as an analogue the picture surface; 
• fractures in cases of anamorphosis; 
• goes opaque when kissed by Narcissus (desire); 
• is the site of the objet a (object of desire, trauma of 
the real); 
• had its first iteration as the mirror in the mirror 
stage; 
• is sublimated by the symbolic order. 
The screen does not 
support the tripartite 
reading for long.  It 
seems to be the herald 
of a resolutely 2-
dimensional world.  To 
the extent that the 
operational montage is 
read as spatial, it collapses as soon as we remember that 
the screen is the opaque site for the representation of 
space.  In each iteration of the screen in different 
contexts - Minim chapels, architectural tromp l’œil 
painting, modern architecture - we are led to the 
conclusion that the screen predicates an identity between 
2- and 3- dimensions.  In the visual register, all images 
are projections in two dimensions.  There is nothing but 
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the screen.  The gaze and the subject, to the extent that 
they are geometric positions, are inscribed on the screen.  
Likewise for space.  The screen is identical to the visual 
field. 
The extent to which the diagram represents the 
structure of the subject (of psychoanalysis) in the 
imaginary register, it is not spatial at all, except in a 
metaphorical sense.  In this case, the structure is not 
tripartite, but bipartite:  it is a screen vis-à-vis 
projections.  The subject does not look at the screen, the 
subject is the screen.  The subject is a surface.  The 
other positions – gaze, ego – are projections of that 
surface.  One position seems to the subject to be the point 
from which the subject looks; the other the point from 
which the subject feels looked at.  These two positions are 
about two different identifications that the subject makes, 
and in the realm of subjecthood, all identifications are 
self-identifications.  The gaze is inside each subject.37  
The gaze is the manifestation of the objet a in the visual 
field (it manifests differently in different drives), and 
the objet a is ‘the little bit of the subject lost to the 
subject’.38  In Lacan’s tuna can story, the glint of light 
represents the little bit of himself which he does not 
understand, the bit he feels uncomfortable with, is 
alienated from, misrecognises (he thought he might be a 
fisherman, in fact he’s a poor little rich kid).39 
 
Objet petit a  
Phenomenal flatness suggests something about the 
reading of architecture.  It directs our attention toward 
the surfaces of architecture, and upon any architecture 
which manifests as surface, whether it be the literal 
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opacity of Villa Schwob, the phenomenal opacity of Villa 
Stein, or the screeny graphicy aesthetics of e.g. Jean 
Nouvel or Rem Koolhaus, whose spaces seem to manifest as 
series of screens of varying degrees of translucence and 
reflection depending upon the amount of information they 
are required to carry. 
It suggests further that the surfaces upon which we 
might expect the objet a of architecture to be found are 
the surfaces of photographs of architecture, and not on the 
walls, nor even the painted or reflected walls, of 
architecture.  It is not merely that the photograph ensures 
that we are in a discourse of surface and flatness (a kind 
of corrective against errant discourse).  Rather:  the sign 
of the objet a in architecture has to do with the 
relationships which an architecture establishes with the 
media of representation.  We are looking for an 
architecture which, like the psychoanalytic subject, 
represents itself to itself; accepting in this predicament, 
the scope for misrecognition.  We are no longer interested 
in using Lacanian discourse to position the subject of 
perception in architecture.  This is Colomina’s turf.  
According to the present reading of Lacan, architecture is 
the subject.  Architecture represents itself.  We know from 
the mirror stage (although it is never said so clearly) 
that the little bit of the subject lost to the subject is 
the subject’s image.  An identity is gained, an image is 
lost.  In a similar vein, the relation of architecture to 
its image is one of identity and loss.  This harks back to 
the originary dialectic between a primitive architecture 
and its representation by painting.  Perspective painting 
is the mirror stage of architecture, and thereafter 
architecture is involved in ‘a drama whose internal thrust 
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Objet a at Ville d’Avray:  Architecture 
representing itself 
is precipitated from insufficiency and anticipation’40  The 
mirror stage is the birthing scenario of the objet a in 
which the subject loses its objet a to an image, and we 
hope to capture it in a photograph. 
Objet a might only appear in an image of architecture, 
and not in architecture itself.  Or only appear in the 
space between architecture and its image.  In The Return of 
the Real, Foster 
suggests that the 
repetitive screen 
printing of 
Warhol’s Marilyns 
are an attempt to 
screen the real.  
He is particularly 
attentive to the 
effects of 
repetition and misregistration.41  Following Foster, we 
begin our search by looking for repetitive facades and 
serial spaces, which are the effect of the architecture 
representing itself.  Having been appraised of the nature 
of the screen, we might look for repetition in photographs 
of architecture and not architecture itself.  We might find 
symptoms of the objet a in, say, the visual mis-
registrations between architecture and its image, as if 
Lacan’s slide projector were no longer perfectly registered 
on his interior.  We might begin by looking at photographs 
of Foster’s new Reichstag, which brings glass in…. 
This underscores the fact that the psychoanalytic 
subject is culturally and historically determined.  The 
objet a (under any name) was not available to the subject 
of perception until the accidental discovery of the power 
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of mirrors one fine day in the primordial forests of 
Classical Greece.  It might not have been available to the 
subject until the invention of perspective projection, and 
perhaps not fully available to the general public until the 
invention of photography. 
                                                
26   The silent r of Parrhasios marks him like the a of 
differance.  As if there were another painter called Parhasios 
who was just a really good illusionistic painter like Zeuxis. 
27   See for instance Robert Ryman’s (1930-) Ledger (1983). 
28   Absalon (1964-1993) was an Israeli-French artist. 
29   Laugier’s image shows a personification of architecture 
gesturing regally toward the hut.  Because of her position next 
to it but not in it, because of her position as personification 
on high, because of her Olympian remove (intellectualist) from 
the cares of the world, she will only ever have an anamorphic 
view of her primitive hut (= gaze in the architectural field, or 
Other of the subject). 
30   The illusionistic painting of an curtain is quite different 
from the painting of grapes or most any other objects.  It is a 
visual pun (source of psychoanalytic insight). 
31   Villa Schwob, 1916, La Chaux-de-Fonds.  Colin Rowe relates 
the façade to a mannerist façade motif (Rowe, ‘Mannerism and 
modern architecture’).  Schwob used a prototype concrete frame 
which was refined in later works as the Domino frame, one of the 
icons of modernism.  The Schwob facade is thus an answer in 
advance to the literal transparency of the Bauhaus. 
32   See for instance the blank graphed facades of Jean Nouvel.  
In the Cartier headquarters (1990), and several other corporate 
projects, the signs and characteristics of the interior are 
erased by repetitive writing on glass.  Using different means 
altogether, the stultifying repetition of the same block form in 
Hilberseimer’s urban projects (1924, 1930), suggests a 
problematising of representation, and a consequent sense of 
erasure. 
33   Baldessarri Peruzzi (1481-1536), the Hall of Perspectives, 
Villa Farnesina, Rome (ca. 1512). 
34   All these examples are mentioned in Baltrusaitis. 
35   Colin Rowe and Robert Slutzky, ‘Transparency:  Literal and 
Phenomenal’, reprinted in Rowe, The Mathematics of the Ideal 
Villa and other essays.  (Cambridge MA:  MIT Press, 1976) pp159-
183.  First published in Perspecta, the Yale Journal of 
Architecture, 1963.  No one has made much of the connection 
between phenomenal transparency and the screen in Lacan’s 
imaginary register, although Anthony Vidler suggests that there 
ought to be one in ‘Transparency’ in Vidler, The Architectural 
Uncanny.  (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1994) pp217-226. 
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36   See Stephen King, The Langoliers, published in the 
collection, Four Past Midnight.  (New American Library, 1991).  
See Village of the Damned, 1960, directed by Wolf Rilla, starring 
George Sanders, screenplay by Rilla and Stirling Silliphant.  
Based on a novel by Wyndham Lewis, The Midwich Cuckoos, 1957. 
37   This is born out by the genesis of the operational montage 
in the mirror stage.  The mirror stage is one half of this 
diagram.  The positions of subject and gaze are superimposed by 
the reflective power of the mirror. 
38   Foster, op cit., p. 141 
39   4FCPA p95 
40   Lacan, ‘The mirror stage’ in Ecrits, A selection.  (New 
York:  Norton, 1977)  P4. 
41   Foster, op cit., pp 127-170. 
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 The mirror stage 
Lacan’s metaphor is architecture 
 
Gilded mirrors 
It is clear that Lacan has a deep affinity for the 17th 
and 18th century Baroque interior, the kind with huge 
mirrored wall panels surrounded by gilded frames with lots 
of curlicues, mirrors that replicate rooms endlessly, 
interiors which never end.  No other architecture matches 
the convoluted, folded, anamorphic nature of his thought 
and language, as does the interior and plot of that 
consummate mirror movie, whose namesake is the town which 
hosted the conference where ‘The mirror stage’ was read.42  
This is an architecture whose aesthetic and spatial effect 
is based upon the 
mirror’s potential 
for endlessly 
replicating and 
fracturing space 
upon its surface, 
and it is closely 
linked to the work 
of virtuoso perspective two-pointers like the Bibiena 
Bros., Scenographers, who produced endlessly replicating 
stage interiors.43 
This architecture recalls the engravings of the Minim 
chapels, which in turn recalls the camera obscura, all of 
which are machines for the projection of space upon the 
interior and whose effect depends upon the dialogue between 
2- and 3- dimensional surfaces.  It recalls Lacan’s 
originary architecture, in its exchange between image and 
architecture, projected picture and interior.  It is an 
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architecture of almost obsessive attention to surface and 
surface encrustation, framing, multiplicity, and most 
importantly, the surface effects of language at the expense 
of depth; the architecture which an ideologue die-hard 
structuralist like LeCorbusier called les horreurs de Rome, 
all the while illustrating some of the most beautiful 
interiors in Rome, including the painted tromp l’œil state 
rooms of Castell Sant’ Angelo.44  It is an architecture with 
correspondingly little interest in overt manifestation of 
structural geometry and organisation, in plan and façade, 
which are the signs and characteristics of both the Italian 
renaissance and European modernism. 
These observations make the sense of his text clearer, 
but they raise the question of the metaphoricity of the 
text generally (the subject is a boudoir), and 
specifically, the relation of his machines to the structure 
of the psyche.  We can ask, for instance, what is the 
status of the mirror in the mirror stage.45  I provisionally 
distinguish metaphor from model.  In metaphor, something in 
one register explains the function or structure of 
something in another.  Lacan uses anamorphosis to explain 
the emergence of desire in the subject.  He relates a 
phenomenon in painting to a state of mind, which involves 
jumping registers from painting to psyche.  Model is 
reserved for more direct relations between terms, as when 
they inhabit the same register and can be in one-to-one 
correspondence.  A scale model is a model of a building 
because they are both objects, but a photograph has a 
metaphoric relationship to the building, if it exposes 
certain relationships, as for instance LeCorbusier’s 
photographs of Ville d’Avray, which pose the question of an 
architectural gaze. 
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Similarly, in that order [the order of images], which is 
particularly satisfying for the subject, connoted in psycho-
analytic experience by the term narcissism – in which I have 
striven to reintroduce the essential structure it derives from 
its reference to the specular image – in the satisfaction, not to 
say self-satisfaction, that diffuses from it, which gives the 
subject a pretext for such a profound méconnaissance – and does 
its empire not extend as far as this reference of the 
philosophical tradition represented by plenitude encountered by 
the subject in the mode of contemplation – can we not also grasp 
that which has been eluded, namely the function of the 
gaze?[4FCfPA p74] 
 
So, what is the status of the mirror in the mirror 
stage?  ‘The mirror stage’ lays the groundwork for the 
imaginary order.  It is a reading of Freud’s ‘On 
Narcissism:  an Introduction (1914)’.46  Lacan’s self 
reflective world of virtual images is a metaphoric 
elaboration on Freud’s use of words like projection and its 
cognates (N p88) and self regard (N p92 ff.).  It has the 
same metaphoric status as does the mythic narrative of 
Narcissus.  This confirms: 
• that the scopic field, whose structure is diagrammed by 
the operational montage is in the subject’s head; and, 
• that the geometral point of Lacan’s gaze is Freud’s ego 
ideal, (‘imposed from without’(N p95) ‘it is the common 
ideal of a family class or nation’(N p96)); and, 
• that consciousness – which is that observing agency (N 
p91 n1) which monitors the ego on behalf of the ego-
ideal – is the self-reflexive series of relationships 
diagrammed by the operational montage. 
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 An optical architecture 
Lacan’s mirror image must be understood as an 
elaboration on figurative and literal reflection, and may 
include those aspects of self image ‘conveyed to the 
subject by the medium of the voice’(N p90).  Where Freud 
writes ‘What he projects before him as his ideal…’(N p88), 
Lacan writes that the mirror stage will institute the I in 
a drama in which it moves ‘from insufficiency to 
anticipation’(MS p4) and leads ‘to the assumption of the 
armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its 
rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development’(MS 
p4).  The subject is also ‘caught up in the lure of spatial 
identification’(MS p4) – we are all, to varying degrees 
captivated by our own image in a storefront. 
 Lacan differs from Freud on the role of the voice.  
Although he does not rule voice out, he insists upon the 
temporal priority of the imaginary order.  Thus he 
maintains in ‘The mirror stage’ that the subject’s 
identification with its mirror image occurs ‘before it is 
objectified in the dialectic of identification with the 
other, and before language restores to it, in the 
universal, its function as subject’(p2), ‘before its social 
determination’(p2).  
In ‘The two 
narcissisms’ and ‘The 
ego-ideal and ideal 
ego’ (Seminar 1:  
Freud’s papers on 
technique), Lacan 
defines the relation 
between voice and 
image with his optical 
device; and this device, while it would be a fantastic 
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model for an architecture (in league with the camera 
obscura and Plato’s cave, or Laugier’s primitive hut, or 
Absalon’s), it can only be understood metaphorically when 
applied to the subject of perception.  It is an elaborate 
machine with plane and concave mirrors, which situate the 
virtual image of the subject (narcissistic identification, 
future objet a) within an environment of real images 
(visual field).  This catoptric environment represents the 
imaginary order, but the symbolic order determines the 
angles of the mirrors, and hence determines what is 
reflected back to the subject.47  It models certain 
relationships, but they bear no direct relation to the 
subject, either projective, formal, scalar, etc.  It is 
only by a metaphoric leap, the leap that allows meaning to 
travel, that we can call them models. 
We will provisionally accept that one-eyed space is 
not the same as two-eyed space, and that therefore we 
cannot make a corresponding identity between the scopic 
field and the visual field as we could between the 2- and 
3- dimensional iterations of the screen.  The photograph is 
identical to the scopic field/screen because it is 
synchronic, instantaneous, single point, stationary, and 
opaque.48  This is another reason for using the photograph 
of an architecture, and not the architecture, in our scopic 
analysis.  To define the metaphoric relationship between 
scopic and visual fields more precisely, we have to re-
enter Lacan’s text. 
 
The production of meaning 
Lacan defines metaphor as the replacement of one 
signifier by another along the vertical substitutive axis 
of language.49  This vertical stack of signifiers is a kind 
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 You never look at me from the 
place from which I see you. 
of meaning vending machine.  This year’s signifier is 
pushed out the bottom to become next year’s signified.  
Thus meaning is continually created and circulated around 
the world.  Interpretation – including this paper’s – is 
one of the ways that visual images are brought into the 
symbolic order.  (By writing, I refuse to let the image 
remain an image, and delineate its significance.)  Lacan’s 
sublimation is a special case, whereby the image enters the 
symbolic order, and in particular the anamorphic image 
becomes a signifier for absence and emptiness.  It is the 
special case because it is the originary one, which 
inaugurates meaning, where 
before there had only been 
images which were not 
signifiers.50  But it applies 
equally to the relation of the 
mirror to operational montage.  
Within Lacan’s text, the 
mirror is the sign of a series 
of intra-subjective relations.  
In the case of the 
architecture that represents itself, its projected image 
becomes the signifier, behind which the architecture, the 
signified, is screened.  There are other ways that things 
can be related in Lacan’s text (there are metonymic 
relations), but at the level of meaning, this is all there 
is.  Metaphor is the site of interpretation, and it does 
not get better than this. 
 The final species of emptiness is architecture in its 
pre-linguistic state, which is not known, but must be 
posited in order to hold Piranesi’s stones up.  It precedes 
meaning; it is what holds meaning together, the cement 
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(cement was invented by the Romans) which cements the 
metonymic relationship of signifiers on the signifying 
chain.  The cement which will be next year’s image on the 
metaphoric axis.  (Are signifiers pushed off the top of the 
stack as well?)  Alternatively, it is architecture at a 
time before the symbolic order, when it is the potential 
but not yet realised site for meaning.  Not an architecture 
empty of Spirit à la Hegel, but an architecture empty of 
meaning because meaning has not yet been invented, which 
may be more or less the same thing, since meaning is the 
province of Spirit.  In this case, the image does not 
screen a lumpen real; until its integration into the 
symbolic, the image is the lumpen real. 
Lacan’s project aligns Freud with 20th century French 
thought.  Lacan integrated Freud to Saussurean linguistics 
(the subject is an effect of language) in a manner 
analogous to Levi-Strauss’ application of linguistics to 
anthropology.  One of the points of this paper is that 
Lacan effected a similar integration of Freud into visual 
thought.  Lacan started with Freud’s ‘On narcissism’ (‘The 
two narcissism’ and ‘The ego-ideal and ideal ego’ in 
Seminar 1).  He stitches Freudian psychoanalysis, via 
Baltrusaitis’ images of projecting machines, into the 
visual/ optical/ representation tradition, divested of its 
metaphysics and divine inspiration, which had already begun 
to model subjectivity and its relation to the world.  
Freud’s thought was raw material, an empty lumpen real, the 
Freudian Thing, which required assimilation into the 
symbolic order of 20th century French thought and visual 
tradition.  Lacan’s project has the opposite sense to 
Piranesi’s project, picking up Piranesi’s stones to restore 
the illusion of meaning to architecture. 
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We suggest that Lacan’s use of non-enclosing 
topological forms like the Klein bottle, Mobius strip, or 
Borromean knot, which are discussed at length in Seminar 
13, are part of the same project.  On this view, Freud 
failed to integrate psychoanalysis into the physical 
sciences, a project he was ambivalent about.  Lacan – 
dubious also, of this project - looks instead to the 
discourse of formal mathematics (at least ‘scientific’ if 
not empirical).  The mobius, for instance, has two sides 
but only one surface.  Its logic can articulate a binary 
opposition, interior/exterior, but the terms are seen to 
run into each other.51 
These forms offer interesting challenges to ways of 
thinking about architecture, because architecture and 
space-making, typically conceived, are about enclosure and 
threshold.  Emptiness might be more clearly articulated 
outside a discourse of closure because then it would be 
more difficult to conflate with an empty nave; and it is 
possible that an architecture of, e.g., folded surfaces 
(Greg Lynn’s?) would have a manifest affinity to the 
screen.  The articulation of emptiness within a mobius 
space is an obvious next step for this paper. 
These forms also raise interesting problems about 
their status, metaphoric or otherwise, in Lacan’s text.  
According to Schneiderman, Lacan adopted these forms in 
response to an enlightenment tradition which produced the 
unfathomable suffering of two world wars, an intellectual 
tradition which valorises the systematic, is founded on 
binary oppositions, and whose formal metaphors include, 
e.g., Plato’s cave, the Trojan horse, the camera obscura.  
If Hitler might have listened to Mozart and read Kant, what 
hope does anti-fascist intellectual resistance offer – be 
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it communism, existentialism, etc. – since it inhabits the 
same forms of thought.  Because of their resistance to 
closure, and their conflation of inside and outside 
surfaces, the Klein bottle et. al. have the potential to 
offer the model of a new form of subjectivity.  Similarly, 
Lacan’s seminars almost never provide the satisfaction of 
intellectual mastery, of finally arriving at a conclusion, 
but remain critically open.52 
                                                
42   Last Year in Marienbad (Alain Resnais, director, Alain 
Robbe-Grillet, screenplay) is set in a Baroque chateau of mirrors 
and is about the replication and fracturing of experience in 
appearance and memory, in particular, how desire unfolds in the 
register of images real and virtual.  See the screenplay (New 
York:  Grove Press, 1962). 
43   The Bibiena family were the most prolific practitioners of 
the Bolognese school of quadratura or illusionist architecture.  
Two generations of brothers dominated the scene from last quarter 
of the 17th century, producing elaborate one- and two- point 
perspective screens for stage sets.  Lacan never talks directly 
about two-point perspective, in which the vanishing point does 
not align with the position of the I/eye of the subject.  It is 
not clear what about the gaze and the blind spot changes once 
this structural identification is abandoned. 
44   LeCorbusier, Vers une Architecture, ‘La leçon de Rome’. 
(Paris:  1923). 
45   It must be noted that all psychoanalytic texts are 
metaphoric; even to use the words entity or structure in 
connection with the psyche is to attribute the properties of 
material (contour, thingness) to what is immaterial and known 
only through its linguistic symptoms and traces. 
46   Lacan, ‘The mirror stage’, in Ecrits, a selection.  (New 
York:  Norton, 1977).  Page references in text.  And:  Sigmund 
Freud, ‘On narcissism:  an introduction (1914)’, in On 
Metapsychology, Volume 11 of The Penguin Freud Library.  (London:  
Penguin, 1984).  Henceforth refered to in text as N. 
47   Seminar 1, p.140, ‘Now let’s postulate that the inclination 
of the plane mirror is governed by the voice of the other.’ 
48   By synchronic I mean that the time – a past moment – in 
each photograph is equivalent. 
49   I am dependent upon Evans, op cit., for this discussion.  
See Evans, entry on metaphor and metonymy. 
50   It is difficult to understand the pre-lingual status of the 
image, and the relationship it might have to the subject.  The 
pre-lingual subject does not exist:  it forms when it loses a 
little bit of itself to the Other, which loss happens in 
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language.  The identification to which Lacan refers in ‘The 
Mirror Stage’ would be something like the identification a bull 
makes when he charges the red cloth for the first time.  This red 
has to precede signification as the theoretical limit of 
signification. 
51   Freud’s ‘the Uncanny’ is a classic example of a mobius 
argument, in which two words of opposite sense, heimlich and 
unheimlich, are shown to cohabit each other’s surfaces.  Sigmund 
Freud, ‘The Uncanny’ in The Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud 
Volume IV, transl. by Joan Riviere.  (London:  Hogarth Press, 
1949). 
52  See Stuart Schneiderman, Jacque Lacan, Death of an 
intellectual hero. (Cambridge, MA:  HUP, 1983) chapter 8.  This 
book suffers for not having a bibliography, footnotes, index, or 
chapter titles. 
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